

our context interpersonally. These standards are, in the terms used in the preceding chapter, patterns of value-orientation, and as such are a particularly crucial part of the cultural tradition of the social system.⁸

The orientation of one actor to the contingent action of another inherently involves evaluative orientation, because the element of contingency implies the relevance of a system of alternatives. Stability of interaction in turn depends on the condition that the particular acts of evaluation on both sides should be oriented to common standards since only in terms of such standards is "order" in either the communication or the motivational contexts possible.

There is a range of possible modes of orientation in the motivational sense to a value-standard. Perhaps the most important distinction is between the attitude of "expediency" at one pole, where conformity or non-conformity is a function of the instrumental interests of the actor, and at the other pole the "introjection" or internalization of the standard so that to act in conformity with it becomes a need-disposition in the actor's own personality structure, relatively independently of any instrumentally significant consequences of that conformity. The latter is to be treated as the basic type of integration of motivation with a normative pattern-structure of values.

In order to justify this last proposition it is necessary to go somewhat further into the nature of the interaction process. In the case of a given actor, ego, there is soon built up a system of expectations relative to a given other, alter. With respect to alter's action this implies for ego hopes and anxieties, that is, some of alter's possible reactions will be favorable from ego's point of view and others unfavorable. By and large we are on psychological grounds justified in saying ego's orientation will on balance tend to be oriented to stimulating the favorable, gratification-producing reactions and avoiding provocations for the unfavorable, deprivation-producing reactions.

Generally, in so far as the normative standards in terms of which ego and alter are interacting are shared and clear, favorable reactions on the part of alter will tend to be stimulated by ego's action conforming with the standards in question, and the unfavorable, by his

⁸The other components of the cultural tradition pose somewhat different problems which will be taken up in the following section.

in its motivational aspect constitutes one of the most important problem areas of action theory and specifically of the theory of social systems. This subject will be further explored in Chapters VIII and IX below.

§ THE INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION OF ACTION ELEMENTS

A CONCRETE action system is an integrated⁷ structure of action elements in relation to a situation. This means essentially integration of motivational and cultural or symbolic elements, brought together in a certain kind of ordered system.

The analysis of the general features of action in the previous chapter, combined with the immediately preceding analysis of the functional prerequisites of social systems, yield certain specifications which can guide us to strategic features of this ordered structure.

It is inherent in an action system that action is, to use one phrase, "normatively oriented." This follows, as was shown, from the concept of expectations and its place in action theory, especially in the "active" phase in which the actor pursues goals. Expectations then, in combination with the "double contingency" of the process of interaction as it has been called, create a crucially imperative problem of order. Two aspects of this problem of order may in turn be distinguished, order in the symbolic systems which make communication possible, and order in the mutuality of motivational orientation to the normative aspect of expectations, the "Hobbesian" problem of order.

The problem of order, and thus of the nature of the integration of stable systems of social interaction, that is, of social structure, thus focuses on the integration of the motivation of actors with the normative cultural standards which integrate the action system, in

⁷We are here concerned with what has been called the "boundary-maintaining" type of system (*Values, Motives, and Systems of Action*, op. cit.). For this type of system, as noted there, the concept integration has a double reference: a) to the compatibility of the components of the system with each other so that change is not necessitated before equilibrium can be reached, and b) to the maintenance of the conditions of the distinctiveness of the system within its boundaries over against its environment. Integration may be relative to a moving equilibrium, i.e., an orderly process of change of the system, as well as to a static equilibrium.

deviating from them (and vice versa of course). The result of this circumstance is the tendency for the conformity-deviation dimension and the favorable-unfavorable or the gratification-deprivation dimension to coincide. In other words the basic condition on which an interaction system can be stabilized is for the interests of the actors to be bound to conformity with a shared system of value-orientation standards.

There is in turn a two-fold structure of this 'binding in.' In the first place, by virtue of internalization of the standard, conformity with it tends to be of personal, expressive and/or instrumental significance to ego. In the second place, the structuring of the reactions of alter to ego's action as sanctions is a function of his conformity with the standard. Therefore conformity as a direct mode of the fulfillment of his own need-dispositions tends to coincide with conformity as a condition of eliciting the favorable and avoiding the unfavorable reactions of others. In so far as, relative to the actions of a plurality of actors, conformity with a value-orientation standard meets *both* these criteria, that is from the point of view of any given actor in the system, it is both a mode of the fulfillment of his own need-dispositions and a condition of "optimizing" the reactions of other significant actors, that standard will be said to be "institutionalized."

A value pattern in this sense is always institutionalized in an interaction context. Therefore there is always a double aspect of the expectation system which is integrated in relation to it. On the one hand there are the expectations which concern and in part set standards for the behavior of the actor, ego, who is taken as the point of reference; these are his "role-expectations." On the other hand, from his point of view there is a set of expectations relative to the contingently probable reactions of others (alters)—these will be called "sanctions," which in turn may be subdivided into positive and negative according to whether they are felt by ego to be gratification-promoting or depriving. The relation between role-expectations and sanctions then is clearly reciprocal. What are sanctions to ego are role-expectations to alter and vice versa.

A role then is a sector of the total orientation system of an individual actor which is organized about expectations in relation to a particular interaction context, that is integrated with a particular

set of value-standards which govern interaction with one or more alters in the appropriate complementary roles. These alters need not be a defined group of individuals, but can involve any alter if and when he comes into a particular complementary interaction relationship with ego which involves a reciprocity of expectations with reference to common standards of value-orientation.

The institutionalization of a set of role-expectations and of the corresponding sanctions is clearly a matter of degree. This degree is a function of two sets of variables; on the one hand those affecting the actual sharedness of the value-orientation patterns, on the other those determining the motivational orientation or commitment to the fulfillment of the relevant expectations. As we shall see a variety of factors can influence this degree of institutionalization through each of these channels. The polar antithesis of full institutionalization is, however, *anomie*, the absence of structured complementarity of the interaction process or, what is the same thing, the complete breakdown of normative order in both senses. This is, however, a limiting concept which is never descriptive of a concrete social system. Just as there are degrees of institutionalization so are there also degrees of *anomie*. The one is the obverse of the other.

An *institution* will be said to be a complex of institutionalized role integrates⁹ which is of strategic structural significance in the social system in question. The institution should be considered to be a higher order unit of social structure than the role, and indeed it is made up of a plurality of interdependent role-patterns or components of them. Thus when we speak of the "institution of property" in a social system we bring together those aspects of the roles of the component actors which have to do with the integration of action-expectations with the value-patterns governing the definition of rights in "possessions" and obligations relative to them. An institution in this sense should be clearly distinguished from a collectivity. A collectivity is a system of concretely interactive specific roles. An institution on the other hand is a complex of patterned elements in role-expectations which may apply to an indefinite number of collectivities. Conversely, a collectivity may be the focus of a whole series of institutions. Thus the institutions of marriage and of par-

⁹ Or status-relationships. There are no roles without corresponding statuses and vice versa.

enthood are both constitutive of a particular family as a collectivity.

It is now necessary to go back to certain aspects of the integration of action elements in institutionalized roles. The starting point is the crucial significance of interaction and the corresponding complementarity of expectations. *What are expectations to ego are sanctions to alter and vice versa*, for among the expectations of any role, indeed the central part of them, are definitions of how its incumbent should act toward others, and these definitions are structured along the conformity-deviance dimension. The question of how far sanctions are intended by the actor who imposes them to influence the behavior of the other, or to "reward" his conformity and to "punish" his deviance, may remain an open question for the moment. The important point is that such intention is *not a criterion* of the concept of sanctions as here used. The criterion is merely that they are meaningful reactions of alter to what ego does.

Certain empirical generalizations seem to be established which can carry us somewhat farther in interpreting the dynamic significance of this reciprocal integration of role-expectations. The first derives from what was above called the "sensitivity" of the human personality to the attitudes of others. From this it follows that only in limiting cases will the significance of sanctions be purely instrumental, that is, will the probability of a given reaction be significant only as a set of expected conditions of the situation which influence the probability of successful attainment of a particular goal or the probable cost of its attainment. Conformity with role-expectations will always to a greater or less degree involve motivational elements of the character referred to in psychological discussions as composing the "ego-ideal" or the superego, elements of "self-respect," adequacy or "security" in the psychological sense. Such elements are not of course necessarily central for every concrete actor in every concrete situation which is connected with a set of institutionalized role-expectations. A particular individual or class of them may well become involved in an interaction situation in which their own "sentiments" are only very peripherally involved. But in a general sense in social situations, the circumstances of socialization and other factors preclude that this should be the predominant situation in permanent social systems which involve the major motivational interests of the participant actors. The focal case is that where the

actor "cares" how others react to him in much more than a purely instrumental sense.

Considering that we are talking about the conditions of relatively stable interaction in social systems, it follows from this that the value-standards which define institutionalized role-expectations assume to a greater or less degree a moral significance. Conformity with them becomes, that is, to some degree a matter of the fulfillment of obligations which ego carries relative to the interests of the larger action system in which he is involved, that is a social system. The sharing of such common value patterns, entailing a sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of obligations, then creates a solidarity among those mutually oriented to the common values. The actors concerned will be said to constitute, within the area of relevance of these values, a *collectivity*.

For some classes of participants the significance of collectivity membership may be predominantly its usefulness in an instrumental context to their "private" goals. But such an orientation cannot be constitutive of the collectivity itself, and so far as it predominates, tends to disrupt the solidarity of the collectivity. This is *most emphatically, not* to say that participation in a solitary collectivity tends in general to interfere with the attainment of the individual's private goals, but that without the attachment to the constitutive common values the collectivity tends to dissolve. If this attachment is given, there is room for much fulfillment of private interests.

Attachment to common values means, motivationally considered, that the actors have common "sentiments"¹⁰ in support of the value patterns, which may be defined as meaning that conformity with the relevant expectations is treated as a "good thing" relatively independently of any specific instrumental "advantage" to be gained from such conformity, e.g., in the avoidance of negative sanctions. Furthermore, this attachment to common values, while it may fit the immediate gratificational needs of the actor, always has also a "moral" aspect in that to some degree this conformity defines the "responsibilities" of the actor in the wider, that is, social action system in which he participates. Obviously the specific focus of re-

¹⁰ The term "sentiments" is here used to denote culturally organized cathetic and/or evaluative modes or patterns of orientation toward particular objects or classes of objects. A sentiment thus involves the internalization of cultural patterns.

sponsibility is the collectivity which is constituted by a particular common value-orientation.

Finally, it is quite clear that the "sentiments" which support such common values are not ordinarily in their specific structure the manifestation of constitutionally given propensities of the organism. They are in general learned or acquired. Furthermore, the part they play in the orientation of action is not predominantly that of cultural objects which are cognized and "adapted to" but the culture patterns have come to be internalized; they constitute part of the structure of the personality system of the actor itself. Such sentiments or "value-attitudes" as they may be called, are therefore genuine need-dispositions of the personality. It is only by virtue of internalization of institutionalized values that a genuine motivational integration of behavior in the social structure takes place, that the "deeper" layers of motivation become harnessed to the fulfillment of role-expectations. It is only when this has taken place to a high degree that it is possible to say that a social system is highly integrated, and that the interests of the collectivity and the private interests of its constituent members can be said to approach¹¹ coincidence.

This integration of a set of common value patterns with the internalized need-disposition structure of the constituent personalities is the core phenomenon of the dynamics of social systems. That the stability of any social system except the most evanescent interaction process is dependent on a degree of such integration may be said to be the fundamental dynamic theorem of sociology. It is the major point of reference for all analysis which may claim to be a dynamic analysis of social process.

It is the significance of institutional integration in this sense which lies at the basis of the place of specifically sociological theory in the sciences of action and the reasons why economic theory and other versions of the conceptual schemes which give predominance to rational instrumental goal-orientation cannot provide an adequate model for the dynamic analysis of the social system in general terms

¹¹ Exact coincidence should be regarded as a limiting case like the famous frictionless machine. Though complete integration of a social system of motivation with a fully consistent set of cultural patterns is empirically unknown, the conception of such an integrated social system is of high theoretical significance.

It has been repeatedly shown that reduction of motivational dynamics to rational instrumental terms leads straight to the Hobbesian thesis, which is a reduction ad absurdum of the concept of a social system. This reductio was carried out in classic form by Durkheim in his *Division of Labor*. But Durkheim's excellent functional analysis has since been enormously reinforced by the implications of modern psychological knowledge with reference to the conditions of socialization and the bases of psychological security and the stability of personality, as well as much further empirical and theoretical analysis of social systems as such.

The theory of institutional behavior, which is essentially sociological theory, is precisely of the highest significance in social science because by setting the problems of social dynamics in a context of institutional structure and drawing the implications of the theorem of institutional integration which has just been stated, this theory is enabled to exploit and extend the knowledge of modern psychology about the non- and irrational aspects of motivation in order to analyze social processes. It follows also that any conceptual scheme which utilizes only the motivational elements of rational instrumental goal-orientation can be an adequate theory only of certain relatively specialized processes *within* the framework of an institutionally structured social system.

The basic theorem of institutional integration like all such basic theorems, explains very little in detail. It provides rather a point of reference in relation to which it is possible in an orderly fashion to introduce successively the more detailed distinctions which are necessary before an adequate analysis of complex behavioral processes can be approached. The present exposition has chosen the deductive approach. Hence it should be clearly understood that empirical applications of the conceptual scheme will be possible only after a much more advanced stage of elaboration has been reached.

There are above all two main directions in which this further elaboration must be carried out. In the first place institutionalized role behavior has been defined as behavior oriented to a value-orientation pattern or system of them. But there are many different kinds of such patterns and many different ways in which role-expectations may be structured relative to them. In place of this extremely general formula then it is necessary to put a differentiated account

of at least some of the most important of these differentiated possibilities. Secondly, the oversimplified "ideal case" depicts complete motivational integration with a given value-pattern in the sense that this pattern as internalized is conceived to produce a need-disposition for conformity with it which insures adequate motivation for conforming behavior. This is obviously a highly simplified model. Before approaching realistic levels it is essential to analyze the complications involved in the possibilities of alienative as well as conformative need-dispositions, of conflicts and ambivalence and the like. An introduction to the elaboration of the cultural aspects of this problem will constitute the remainder of the present chapter.

Before embarking on these considerations, however, a brief discussion is in order of the implications of this theorem of institutional integration for the articulation of social role structure with personality structure. The starting point is that stated above, that the role expectation is structured around a specific interaction context. To whatever extent adequate motivation for the fulfillment of such expectations is achieved, where a set of expectations for those playing the "same" role is uniform there is every reason why in person-ality terms the motivational significance of this uniform behavior cannot be the same for all the personalities concerned. Three crucial reasons for this may be cited. First, the role in question is only one of several in which each individual is involved. Though the expectations for each may be identical with respect to *this* role, the total role systems would only in a limiting case be identical. In each case then the particular role must fit into a different total system of role expectations. Since all the different roles in which an individual is involved are interdependent in his motivational system, the combination of motivational elements which produces the uniform behavior will be different for different personalities.

Secondly, role-involvements do not exhaust the orientation or interest system of any personality. He has internal or "narcissistic" and individually creative foci of interest, and orientations to non-social aspects of his situation. Again for two different personalities only in a limiting case would these non-social aspects of the total orientation system be identical. Since this non-social sector of his personality is interdependent with the social sector, differences in this realm would have repercussions in the field of social motivation

Finally third, there is every reason to believe that it is strictly impossible for the distribution of constitutional differences in the population of a complex social system to correspond directly with the distribution of roles. Therefore the *relation* between the constitutional basis of role-behavior and the overt behavior will be different with different individuals in the same role. Fulfillment of a given set of expectations will impose a greater "strain" on one actor than on another.

For all these reasons and possibly others, it is not possible to infer directly back and forth from personality structure to role behavior. The uniformities of role behavior as well as their differentiations are problematical even *given* the personality constitutions of the participants in the social system. Analysis of the motivational dynamics of role behavior therefore implies the formulation of mechanisms specific to the *sociological* problem level. It is not possible simply to "extrapolate" from the personality mechanisms of the one to those of the many as participants in the social system. This circumstance introduces frightful complications into the task of the sociologist, but unfortunately its implications cannot be evaded.

These considerations should not, however, give the impression that what are ordinarily called "psychological" concepts have no relevance to sociological theory. Just what the scope of the term psychological should be is a question discussion of which may be deferred to the final chapter. But it is of the greatest importance that *motivational* categories should play a central role in sociological theory. Essentially the dynamic elements of personalities and of social systems are made up of the same "stuff." This material must, however, conceptually be differently organized for the purposes of analysis of the two types of system.

§ THE POINTS OF REFERENCE FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS

SO FAR in this chapter we have accomplished two important things. The first section outlined the basic functional problems of an ordered system of social relationships. This defined a set of "imperatives" which are imposed on the variability of social systems if