

produced a host of schools of philosophy inimical to abstract reason—philosophies of the concrete, of 'life' and of 'existence' which extol emotion, the particular and the instinctive, and which are only too ready to support such emotions as those of race, nation, and class.

Thus constructivist rationalism, in its endeavour to make everything subject to rational control, in its preference for the concrete and its refusal to submit to the discipline of abstract rules, comes to join hands with irrationalism. Construction is possible only in the service of particular ends which in the last resort must be non-rational, and on which no rational argument can produce agreement if it is not already present at the outset.

## COSMOS AND TAXIS

The man of system . . . seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chessboard. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chessboard have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in the great chessboard of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it. If those two principles coincide and act in the same direction, the game of human society will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy and successful. If they are opposite or different, the game will go on miserably and the society must be at all times in the highest degree of disorder.

Adam Smith\*

### *The concept of order*

The central concept around which the discussion of this book will turn is that of order, and particularly the distinction between two kinds of order which we will provisionally call 'made' and 'grown' orders. Order is an indispensable concept for the discussion of all complex phenomena, in which it must largely play the role the concept of law plays in the analysis of simpler phenomena.<sup>1</sup> There is no adequate term other than 'order' by which we can describe it, although 'system', 'structure' or 'pattern' may occasionally serve instead. The term 'order' has, of course, a long history in the social sciences,<sup>2</sup> but in recent times it has generally been avoided, largely because of the ambiguity of its meaning and its frequent association with authoritarian views. We cannot do without it, however, and shall have to guard against misinterpretation by sharply defining the general sense in which we shall employ it and then clearly distinguishing between the two different ways in which such order can originate.

By 'order' we shall throughout describe a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct.<sup>3</sup> It is clear that every society must in this sense possess an order and that such an order will often exist without having been deliberately created. As has been said by a distinguished social anthropologist, 'that there is some order, consistency and constancy in social life, is obvious. If there were not, none of us would be able to go about our affairs or satisfy our most elementary needs.'<sup>4</sup>

Living as members of society and dependent for the satisfaction of most of our needs on various forms of co-operation with others, we depend for the effective pursuit of our aims clearly on the correspondence of the expectations concerning the actions of others on which our plans are based with what they will really do. This matching of the intentions and expectations that determine the actions of different individuals is the form in which order manifests itself in social life; and it will be the question of how such an order does come about that will be our immediate concern. The first answer to which our anthropomorphic habits of thought almost inevitably lead us is that it must be due to the design of some thinking mind.<sup>5</sup> And because order has been generally interpreted as such a deliberate arrangement by somebody, the concept has become unpopular among most friends of liberty and has been favoured mainly by authoritarians. According to this interpretation order in society must rest on a relation of command and obedience, or a hierarchical structure of the whole of society in which the will of superiors, and ultimately of some single supreme authority, determines what each individual must do.

This authoritarian connotation of the concept of order derives, however, entirely from the belief that order can be created only by forces outside the system (or 'exogenously'). It does not apply to an equilibrium set up from within<sup>6</sup> (or 'endogenously') such as that which the general theory of the market endeavours to explain. A spontaneous order of this kind has in many respects properties different from those of a made order.

#### *The two sources of order*

The study of spontaneous orders has long been the peculiar task of

economic theory, although, of course, biology has from its beginning been concerned with that special kind of spontaneous order which we call an organism. Only recently has there arisen within the physical sciences under the name of cybernetics a special discipline which is also concerned with what are called self-organizing or self-generating systems.<sup>7</sup>

The distinction of this kind of order from one which has been made by somebody putting the elements of a set in their places or directing their movements is indispensable for any understanding of the processes of society as well as for all social policy. There are several terms available for describing each kind of order. The made order which we have already referred to as an exogenous order or an arrangement may again be described as a construction, an artificial order or, especially where we have to deal with a directed social order, as an *organization*. The grown order, on the other hand, which we have referred to as a self-generating or endogenous order, is in English most conveniently described as a *spontaneous order*. Classical Greek was more fortunate in possessing distinct single words for the two kinds of order, namely *taxis* for a made order, such as, for example, an order of battle,<sup>8</sup> and *kosmos* for a grown order, meaning originally 'a right order in a state or a community'.<sup>9</sup> We shall occasionally avail ourselves of these Greek words as technical terms to describe the two kinds of order.

It would be no exaggeration to say that social theory begins with—and has an object only because of—the discovery that there exist orderly structures which are the product of the action of many men but are not the result of human design. In some fields this is now universally accepted. Although there was a time when men believed that even language and morals had been 'invented' by some genius of the past, everybody recognizes now that they are the outcome of a process of evolution whose results nobody foresaw or designed. But in other fields many people still treat with suspicion the claim that the patterns of interaction of many men can show an order that is of nobody's deliberate making; in the economic sphere, in particular, critics still pour uncomprehending ridicule on Adam Smith's expression of the 'invisible hand' by which, in the language of his time, he described how man is led 'to promote an end which was no part of his intentions'.<sup>10</sup> If indignant reformers still complain of the chaos of economic affairs, insinuating a complete absence of order, this is partly because they cannot conceive of an order which is not deliberately made, and partly

because to them an order means something aiming at concrete purposes which is, as we shall see, what a spontaneous order cannot do.

We shall examine later (see volume 2, chapter 10) how that coincidence of expectations and plans is produced which characterizes the market order and the nature of the benefits we derive from it. For the moment we are concerned only with the fact that an order not made by man does exist and with the reasons why this is not more readily recognized. The main reason is that such orders as that of the market do not obtrude themselves on our senses but have to be traced by our intellect. We cannot see, or otherwise intuitively perceive, this order of meaningful actions, but are only able mentally to reconstruct it by tracing the relations that exist between the elements. We shall describe this feature by saying that it is an abstract and not a concrete order.

#### *The distinguishing properties of spontaneous orders*

One effect of our habitually identifying order with a made order or *taxis* is indeed that we tend to ascribe to all order certain properties which deliberate arrangements regularly, and with respect to some of these properties necessarily, possess. Such orders are relatively *simple* or at least necessarily confined to such moderate degrees of complexity as the maker can still survey; they are usually *concrete* in the sense just mentioned that their existence can be intuitively perceived by inspection; and, finally, having been made deliberately, they invariably do (or at one time did) *serve a purpose* of the maker. None of these characteristics necessarily belong to a spontaneous order or *kosmos*. Its degree of complexity is not limited to what a human mind can master. Its existence need not manifest itself to our senses but may be based on purely *abstract* relations which we can only mentally reconstruct. And not having been made it *cannot* legitimately be said to *have a particular purpose*, although our awareness of its existence may be extremely important for our successful pursuit of a great variety of different purposes.

Spontaneous orders are not necessarily complex, but unlike deliberate human arrangements, they may achieve any degree of complexity. One of our main contentions will be that very complex orders, comprising more particular facts than any brain could ascertain or manipulate, can be brought about only through forces inducing the formation of spontaneous orders.

Spontaneous orders need not be what we have called abstract, but they will often consist of a system of abstract relations between elements which are also defined only by abstract properties, and for this reason will not be intuitively perceivable and not recognizable except on the basis of a theory accounting for their character. The significance of the abstract character of such orders rests on the fact that they may persist while all the particular elements they comprise, and even the number of such elements, change. All that is necessary to preserve such an abstract order is that a certain structure of relationships be maintained, or that elements of a certain kind (but variable in number) continue to be related in a certain manner.

Most important, however, is the relation of a spontaneous order to the conception of purpose. Since such an order has not been created by an outside agency, the order as such also can have no purpose, although its existence may be very serviceable to the individuals which move within such order. But in a different sense it may well be said that the order rests on purposive action of its elements, when 'purpose' would, of course, mean nothing more than that their actions tend to secure the preservation or restoration of that order. The use of 'purposive' in this sense as a sort of 'teleological shorthand', as it has been called by biologists, is unobjectionable so long as we do not imply an awareness of purpose of the part of the elements, but mean merely that the elements have acquired regularities of conduct conducive to the maintenance of the order—presumably because those who did act in certain ways had within the resulting order a better chance of survival than those who did not. In general, however, it is preferable to avoid in this connection the term 'purpose' and to speak instead of 'function'.

#### *Spontaneous orders in nature*

It will be instructive to consider briefly the character of some spontaneous orders which we find in nature, since here some of their characteristic properties stand out most clearly. There are in the physical world many instances of complex orders which we could bring about only by availing ourselves of the known forces which tend to lead to their formation, and never by deliberately placing each element in the appropriate position. We can never produce a crystal or a complex organic compound by placing the individual atoms in such a position that they will form the lattice of a crystal or the system based on benzol rings which make up an

organic compound. But we can create the conditions in which they will arrange themselves in such a manner.

What does in these instances determine not only the general character of the crystal or compound that will be formed but also the particular position of any one element in them? The important point is that the regularity of the conduct of the elements will determine the general character of the resulting order but not all the detail of its particular manifestation. The particular manner in which the resulting abstract order will manifest itself will depend, in addition to the rules which govern the actions of the elements, on their initial position and on all the particular circumstances of the immediate environment to which each of them will react in the course of the formation of that order. The order, in other words, will always be an adaptation to a large number of particular facts which will not be known in their totality to anyone.

We should note that a regular pattern will thus form itself not only if the elements all obey the same rules and their different actions are determined only by the different positions of the several individuals relatively to each other, but also, as is true in the case of the chemical compound, if there are different kinds of elements which act in part according to different rules. Whichever is the case, we shall be able to predict only the general character of the order that will form itself, and not the particular position which any particular element will occupy relatively to any other element.

Another example from physics is in some respects even more instructive. In the familiar school experiment in which iron filings on a sheet of paper are made to arrange themselves along some of the lines of force of a magnet placed below, we can predict the general shape of the chains that will be formed by the filings hooking themselves together; but we cannot predict along which ones of the family of an infinite number of such curves that define the magnetic field these chains will place themselves. This will depend on the position, direction, weight, roughness or smoothness of each of the iron filings and on all the irregularities of the surface of the paper. The forces emanating from the magnet and from each of the iron filings will thus interact with the environment to produce a unique instance of a general pattern, the general character of which will be determined by known laws, but the concrete appearance of which will depend on particular circumstances we cannot fully ascertain.

*In society, reliance on spontaneous order both extends and limits our powers of control*

Since a spontaneous order results from the individual elements adapting themselves to circumstances which directly affect only some of them, and which in their totality need not be known to anyone, it may extend to circumstances so complex that no mind can comprehend them all. Consequently, the concept becomes particularly important when we turn from mechanical to such 'more highly organized' or essentially complex phenomena as we encounter in the realms of life, mind and society. Here we have to deal with 'grown' structures with a degree of complexity which they have assumed and could assume only because they were produced by spontaneous ordering forces. They in consequence present us with peculiar difficulties in our effort to explain them as well as in any attempt to influence their character. Since we can know at most the rules observed by the elements of various kinds of which the structures are made up, but not all the individual elements and never all the particular circumstances in which each of them is placed, our knowledge will be restricted to the general character of the order which will form itself. And even where, as is true of a society of human beings, we may be in a position to alter at least some of the rules of conduct which the elements obey, we shall thereby be able to influence only the general character and not the detail of the resulting order.

This means that, though the use of spontaneous ordering forces enables us to induce the formation of an order of such a degree of complexity (namely comprising elements of such numbers, diversity and variety of conditions) as we could never master intellectually, or deliberately arrange, we will have less power over the details of such an order than we would of one which we produce by arrangement. In the case of spontaneous orders we may, by determining some of the factors which shape them, determine their abstract features, but we will have to leave the particulars to circumstances which we do not know. Thus, by relying on the spontaneously ordering forces, we can extend the scope or range of the order which we may induce to form, precisely because its particular manifestation will depend on many more circumstances than can be known to us—and in the case of a social order, because such an order will utilize the separate knowledge of all its several members, without this knowledge ever being concentrated in a single

mind, or being subject to those processes of deliberate coordination and adaptation which a mind performs.

In consequence, the degree of power of control over the extended and more complex order will be much smaller than that which we could exercise over a made order or *taxis*. There will be many aspects of it over which we will possess no control at all, or which at least we shall not be able to alter without interfering with—and to that extent impeding—the forces producing the spontaneous order. Any desire we may have concerning the particular position of individual elements, or the relation between particular individuals or groups, could not be satisfied without upsetting the overall order. The kind of power which in this respect we would possess over a concrete arrangement or *taxis* we would not have over a spontaneous order where we would know, and be able to influence, only the abstract aspects.

It is important to note here that there are two different respects in which order may be a matter of degree. How well ordered a set of objects or events is depends on how many of the attributes of (or the relations between) the elements we can learn to predict. Different orders may in this respect differ from each other in either or both of two ways: the orderliness may concern only very few relations between the elements, or a great many; and, second, the regularity thus defined may be great in the sense that it will be confirmed by all or nearly all instances, or it may be found to prevail only in a majority of the instances and thus allow us to predict its occurrence only with a certain degree of probability. In the first instance we may predict only a few of the features of the resulting structure, but do so with great confidence; such an order would be limited but may still be perfect. In the second instance we shall be able to predict much more, but with only a fair degree of certainty. The knowledge of the existence of an order will however still be useful even if this order is restricted in either or both these respects; and the reliance on spontaneously ordering forces may be preferable or even indispensable, although the order towards which a system tends will in fact be only more or less imperfectly approached. The market order in particular will regularly secure only a certain probability that the expected relations will prevail, but it is, nevertheless, the only way in which so many activities depending on dispersed knowledge can be effectively integrated into a single order.

*Spontaneous orders result from their elements obeying certain rules of conduct*

We have already indicated that the formation of spontaneous orders is the result of their elements following certain rules in their responses to their immediate environment. The nature of these rules still needs fuller examination, partly because the word 'rule' is apt to suggest some erroneous ideas, and partly because the rules which determine a spontaneous order differ in important respects from another kind of rules which are needed in regulating an organization or *taxis*.

On the first point, the instances of spontaneous orders which we have given from physics are instructive because they clearly show that the rules which govern the actions of the elements of such spontaneous orders need not be rules which are 'known' to these elements; it is sufficient that the elements actually behave in a manner which can be described by such rules. The concept of rules as we use it in this context therefore does not imply that such rules exist in articulated ('verbalized') forms, but only that it is possible to discover rules which the actions of the individuals in fact follow. To emphasize this we have occasionally spoken of 'regularity' rather than of rules, but regularity, of course, means simply that the elements behave according to rules.

That rules in this sense exist and operate without being explicitly known to those who obey them applies also to many of the rules which govern the actions of men and thereby determine a spontaneous social order. Man certainly does not know all the rules which guide his actions in the sense that he is able to state them in words. At least in primitive human society, scarcely less than in animal societies, the structure of social life is determined by rules of conduct which manifest themselves only by being in fact observed. Only when individual intellects begin to differ to a significant degree will it become necessary to express these rules in a form in which they can be communicated and explicitly taught, deviant behaviour corrected, and differences of opinion about appropriate behaviour decided. Although man never existed without laws that he obeyed, he did, of course, exist for hundreds of thousands of years without laws he 'knew' in the sense that he was able to articulate them.

What is of still greater importance in this connection, however, is that not every regularity in the behaviour of the elements does

secure an overall order. Some rules governing individual behaviour might clearly make altogether impossible the formation of an overall order. Our problem is what kind of rules of conduct will produce an order of society and what kind of order particular rules will produce.

The classical instance of rules of the behaviour of the elements which will not produce order comes from the physical sciences: it is the second law of thermodynamics or the law of entropy, according to which the tendency of the molecules of a gas to move at constant speeds in straight lines produces a state for which the term 'perfect disorder' has been coined. Similarly, it is evident that in society some perfectly regular behaviour of the individuals could produce only disorder: if the rule were that any individual should try to kill any other he encountered, or flee as soon as he saw another, the result would clearly be the complete impossibility of an order in which the activities of the individuals were based on collaboration with others.

Society can thus exist only if by a process of selection rules have evolved which lead individuals to behave in a manner which makes social life possible. It should be remembered that for this purpose selection will operate as between societies of different types, that is, be guided by the properties of their respective orders, but that the properties supporting this order will be properties of the individuals, namely their propensity to obey certain rules of conduct on which the order of action of the group as a whole rests.

To put this differently: in a social order the particular circumstances to which each individual will react will be those known to him. But the individual responses to particular circumstances will result in an overall order only if the individuals obey such rules as will produce an order. Even a very limited similarity in their behaviour may be sufficient if the rules which they all obey are such as to produce an order. Such an order will always constitute an adaptation to the multitude of circumstances which are known to all the members of that society taken together but which are not known as a whole to any one person. This need not mean that the different persons will in similar circumstances do precisely the same thing; but merely that for the formation of such an overall order it is necessary that in some respects all individuals follow definite rules, or that their actions are limited to a certain range. In other words, the responses of the individuals to the events in their environment need be similar only in certain abstract aspects to ensure that a determinate overall order will result.

The question which is of central importance as much for social theory as for social policy is thus what properties the rules must possess so that the separate actions of the individuals will produce an overall order. Some such rules all individuals of a society will obey because of the similar manner in which their environment represents itself to their minds. Other they will follow spontaneously because they will be part of their common cultural tradition. But there will be still others which they may have to be made to obey, since, although it would be in the interest of each to disregard them, the overall order on which the success of their actions depends will arise only if these rules are generally followed.

In a modern society based on exchange, one of the chief regularities in individual behaviour will result from the similarity of situations in which most individuals find themselves in working to earn an income; which means that they will normally prefer a larger return from their efforts to a smaller one, and often that they will increase their efforts in a particular direction if the prospects of return improve. This is a rule that will be followed at least with sufficient frequency to impress upon such a society an order of a certain kind. But the fact that most people will follow this rule will still leave the character of the resulting order very indeterminate, and by itself certainly would not be sufficient to give it a beneficial character. For the resulting order to be beneficial people must also observe some conventional rules, that is, rules which do not simply follow from their desires and their insight into relations of cause and effect, but which are normative and tell them what they ought to or ought not to do.

We shall later have to consider more fully the precise relation between the various kinds of rules which the people in fact obey and the resulting order of actions. Our main interest will then be those rules which, because we can deliberately alter them, become the chief instrument whereby we can affect the resulting order, namely the rules of law. At the moment our concern must be to make clear that while the rules on which a spontaneous order rests, may also be of spontaneous origin, this need not always be the case. Although undoubtedly an order originally formed itself spontaneously because the individuals followed rules which had not been deliberately made but had arisen spontaneously, people gradually learned to improve those rules; and it is at least conceivable that the formation of a spontaneous order relies entirely on rules that were deliberately made. The spontaneous character of the resulting order

must therefore be distinguished from the spontaneous origin of the rules on which it rests, and it is possible that an order which would still have to be described as spontaneous rests on rules which are entirely the result of deliberate design. In the kind of society with which we are familiar, of course, only some of the rules which people in fact observe, namely some of the rules of law (but never all, even of these) will be the product of deliberate design, while most of the rules of morals and custom will be spontaneous growths.

That even an order which rests on made rules may be spontaneous in character is shown by the fact that its particular manifestation will always depend on many circumstances which the designer of these rules did not and could not know. The particular content of the order will depend on the concrete circumstances known only to the individuals who obey the rules and apply them to facts known only to them. It will be through the knowledge of these individuals both of the rules and of the particular facts that both will determine the resulting order.

*The spontaneous order of society is made up of individuals and organizations*

In any group of men of more than the smallest size, collaboration will always rest both on spontaneous order as well as on deliberate organization. There is no doubt that for many limited tasks organization is the most powerful method of effective co-ordination because it enables us to adapt the resulting order much more fully to our wishes, while where, because of the complexity of the circumstances to be taken into account, we must rely on the forces making for a spontaneous order, our power over the particular contents of this order is necessarily restricted.

That the two kinds of order will regularly coexist in every society of any degree of complexity does not mean, however, that we can combine them in any manner we like. What in fact we find in all free societies is that, although groups of men will join in organizations for the achievement of some particular ends, the co-ordination of the activities of all these separate organizations, as well as of the separate individuals, is brought about by the forces making for a spontaneous order. The family, the farm, the plant, the firm, the corporation and the various associations, and all the public institutions including government, are organizations which in turn are integrated into a more comprehensive spontaneous order. It is

advisable to reserve the term 'society' for this spontaneous overall order so that we may distinguish it from all the organized smaller groups which will exist within it, as well as from such smaller and more or less isolated groups as the horde, the tribe, or the clan, whose members will at least in some respects act under a central direction for common purposes. In some instances it will be the same group which at times, as when engaged in most of its daily routine, will operate as a spontaneous order maintained by the observation of conventional rules without the necessity of commands, while at other times, as when hunting, migrating, or fighting, it will be acting as an organization under the directing will of a chief.

The spontaneous order which we call a society also need not have such sharp boundaries as an organization will usually possess. There will often be a nucleus, or several nuclei, of more closely related individuals occupying a central position in a more loosely connected but more extensive order. Such particular societies within the Great Society may arise as the result of spatial proximity, or of some other special circumstances which produce closer relations among their members. And different partial societies of this sort will often overlap and every individual may, in addition to being a member of the Great Society, be a member of numerous other spontaneous sub-orders or partial societies of this sort as well as of various organizations existing within the comprehensive Great Society.

Of the organizations existing within the Great Society one which regularly occupies a very special position will be that which we call government. Although it is conceivable that the spontaneous order which we call society may exist without government, if the minimum of rules required for the formation of such an order is observed without an organized apparatus for their enforcement, in most circumstances the organization which we call government becomes indispensable in order to assure that those rules are obeyed.

This particular function of government is somewhat like that of a maintenance squad of a factory, its object being not to produce any particular services or products to be consumed by the citizens, but rather to see that the mechanism which regulates the production of those goods and services is kept in working order. The purposes for which this machinery is currently being used will be determined by those who operate its parts and in the last resort by those who buy its products.

The same organization that is charged with keeping in order an operating structure which the individuals will use for their own purposes, will, however, in addition to the task of enforcing the rules on which that order rests, usually be expected also to render other services which the spontaneous order cannot produce adequately. These two distinct functions of government are usually not clearly separated; yet, as we shall see, the distinction between the coercive functions in which government enforces rules of conduct, and its service functions in which it need merely administer resources placed at its disposal, is of fundamental importance. In the second it is one organization among many and like the others part of a spontaneous overall order, while in the first it provides an essential condition for the preservation of that overall order.

In English it is possible, and has long been usual, to discuss these two types of order in terms of the distinction between 'society' and 'government'. There is no need in the discussion of these problems, so long as only one country is concerned, to bring in the metaphysically charged term 'state'. It is largely under the influence of continental and particularly Hegelian thought that in the course of the last hundred years the practice of speaking of the 'state' (preferably with a capital 'S'), where 'government' is more appropriate and precise, has come to be widely adopted. That which acts, or pursues a policy, is however always the organization of government; and it does not make for clarity to drag in the term 'state' where 'government' is quite sufficient. It becomes particularly misleading when 'the state' rather than 'government' is contrasted with 'society' to indicate that the first is an organization and the second a spontaneous order.

#### *The rules of spontaneous orders and the rules of organization*

One of our chief contentions will be that, though spontaneous order and organization will always coexist, it is still not possible to mix these two principles of order in any manner we like. If this is not more generally understood it is due to the fact that for the determination of both kinds of order we have to rely on rules, and that the important differences between the kinds of rules which the two different kinds of order require are generally not recognized.

To some extent every organization must rely also on rules and not only on specific commands. The reason here is the same as that which makes it necessary for a spontaneous order to rely solely on

rules: namely that by guiding the actions of individuals by rules rather than specific commands it is possible to make use of knowledge which nobody possesses as a whole. Every organization in which the members are not mere tools of the organizer will determine by commands only the function to be performed by each member, the purposes to be achieved, and certain general aspects of the methods to be employed, and will leave the detail to be decided by the individuals on the basis of their respective knowledge and skills.

Organization encounters here the problem which any attempt to bring order into complex human activities meets: the organizer must wish the individuals who are to co-operate to make use of knowledge that he himself does not possess. In none but the most simple kind of organization is it conceivable that all the details of all activities are governed by a single mind. Certainly nobody has yet succeeded in deliberately arranging all the activities that go on in a complex society. If anyone did ever succeed in fully organizing such a society, it would no longer make use of many minds but would be altogether dependent on one mind; it would certainly not be very complex but extremely primitive—and so would soon be the mind whose knowledge and will determined everything. The facts which could enter into the design of such an order could be only those which were known and digested by this mind; and as only he could decide on action and thus gain experience, there would be none of that interplay of many minds in which alone mind can grow.

What distinguishes the rules which will govern action within an organization is that they must be rules for the performance of assigned tasks. They presuppose that the place of each individual in a fixed structure is determined by command and that the rules each individual must obey depend on the place which he has been assigned and on the particular ends which have been indicated for him by the commanding authority. The rules will thus regulate merely the detail of the action of appointed functionaries or agencies of government.

Rules of organization are thus necessarily subsidiary to commands, filling in the gaps left by the commands. Such rules will be different for the different members of the organization according to the different roles which have been assigned to them, and they will have to be interpreted in the light of the purposes determined by the commands. Without the assignment of a function and the



determination of the ends to be pursued by particular commands, the bare abstract rule would not be sufficient to tell each individual what he must do.

By contrast, the rules governing a spontaneous order must be independent of purpose and be the same, if not necessarily for all members, at least for whole classes of members not individually designated by name. They must, as we shall see, be rules applicable to an unknown and indeterminable number of persons and instances. They will have to be applied by the individuals in the light of their respective knowledge and purposes; and their application will be independent of any common purpose, which the individual need not even know.

In the terms we have adopted this means that the general rules of law that a spontaneous order rests on aim at an abstract order, the particular or concrete content of which is not known or foreseen by anyone; while the commands as well as the rules which govern an organization serve particular results aimed at by those who are in command of the organization. The more complex the order aimed at, the greater will be that part of the separate actions which will have to be determined by circumstances not known to those who direct the whole, and the more dependent control will be on rules rather than on specific commands. In the most complex types of organizations, indeed, little more than the assignment of particular functions and the general aim will be determined by command of the supreme authority, while the performance of these functions will be regulated only by rules—yet by rules which at least to some degree are specific to the functions assigned to particular persons. Only when we pass from the biggest kind of organization, government, which as organization must still be dedicated to a circumscribed and determined set of specific purposes, to the overall order of the whole of society, do we find an order which relies solely on rules and is entirely spontaneous in character.

It is because it was not dependent on organization but grew up as a spontaneous order that the structure of modern society has attained that degree of complexity which it possesses and which far exceeds any that could have been achieved by deliberate organization. In fact, of course, the rules which made the growth of this complex order possible were initially not designed in expectation of that result; but those people who happened to adopt suitable rules developed a complex civilization which then often spread to others. To maintain that we must deliberately plan modern society because

it has become so complex is therefore paradoxical, and the result of a complete misunderstanding of these circumstances. The fact is, rather, that we can preserve an order of such complexity not by the method of directing the members, but only indirectly by enforcing and improving the rules conducive to the formation of a spontaneous order.

We shall see that it is impossible, not only to replace the spontaneous order by organization and at the same time to utilize as much of the dispersed knowledge of all its members as possible, but also to improve or correct this order by interfering in it by direct commands. Such a combination of spontaneous order and organization it can never be rational to adopt. While it is sensible to supplement the commands determining an organization by subsidiary rules, and to use organizations as elements of a spontaneous order, it can never be advantageous to supplement the rules governing a spontaneous order by isolated and subsidiary commands concerning those activities where the actions are guided by the general rules of conduct. This is the gist of the argument against 'interference' or 'intervention' in the market order. The reason why such isolated commands requiring specific actions by members of the spontaneous order can never improve but must disrupt that order is that they will refer to a part of a system of interdependent actions determined by information and guided by purposes known only to the several acting persons but not to the directing authority. The spontaneous order arises from each element balancing all the various factors operating on it and by adjusting all its various actions to each other, a balance which will be destroyed if some of the actions are determined by another agency on the basis of different knowledge and in the service of different ends.

What the general argument against 'interference' thus amounts to is that, although we can endeavour to improve a spontaneous order by revising the general rules on which it rests, and can supplement its results by the efforts of various organizations, we cannot improve the results by specific commands that deprive its members of the possibility of using their knowledge for their purposes.

We will have to consider throughout this book how these two kinds of rules have provided the model for two altogether different conceptions of law and how this has brought it about that authors using the same word 'law' have in fact been speaking about different things. This comes out most clearly in the contrast we find throughout history between those to whom law and liberty were

inseparable<sup>11</sup> and those to whom the two were irreconcilable. We find one great tradition extending from the ancient Greeks and Cicero<sup>12</sup> through the Middle Ages<sup>13</sup> to the classical liberals like John Locke, David Hume, Immanuel Kant<sup>14</sup> and the Scottish moral philosophers, down to various American statesmen<sup>15</sup> of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for whom law and liberty could not exist apart from each other; while to Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham<sup>16</sup> and many French thinkers<sup>17</sup> and the modern legal positivists law of necessity means an encroachment on freedom. This apparent conflict between long lines of great thinkers does not mean that they arrived at opposite conclusions, but merely that they were using the word 'law' in different senses.

#### *The terms 'organism' and 'organization'*

A few comments should be added on the terms in which the distinction examined in this chapter has most commonly been discussed in the past. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the terms 'organism' and 'organization' have been frequently used to contrast the two types of order. As we have found it advisable to avoid the former term and to adopt the latter in a specific sense, some comments on their history may be appropriate.

It was natural that the organismal analogy should have been used since ancient times to describe the spontaneous order of society, since organisms were the only kinds of spontaneous order with which everybody was familiar. Organisms are indeed a kind of spontaneous order and as such show many of the characteristics of other spontaneous orders. It was therefore tempting to borrow such terms as 'growth', 'adaptation', and 'function' from them. They are, however, spontaneous orders of a very special kind, possessing also properties which by no means necessarily belong to all spontaneous orders; the analogy in consequence soon becomes more misleading than helpful.<sup>18</sup>

The chief peculiarity of organisms which distinguishes them from the spontaneous orders of society is that in an organism most of the individual elements occupy fixed places which, at least once the organism is mature, they retain once and for all. They also, as a rule, are more or less constant systems consisting of a fixed number of elements which, although some may be replaced by equivalent new ones, retain an order in space readily perceivable with the senses. They are, in consequence, in the terms we have

used, orders of a more concrete kind than the spontaneous orders of society, which may be preserved although the total number of elements changes and the individual elements change their places. This relatively concrete character of the order of organisms shows itself in the fact that their existence as distinct wholes can be perceived intuitively by the senses, while the abstract spontaneous order of social structures usually can only be reconstructed by the mind.

The interpretation of society as an organism has almost invariably been used in support of hierarchic and authoritarian views to which the more general conception of the spontaneous order gives no support. Indeed, since Menenius Agrippa, on the occasion of the first secession of the Roman plebs, used the organismal metaphor to justify the privileges of a particular group, it must have been used innumerable times for similar purposes. The suggestion of fixed places assigned to particular elements according to their distinct 'functions', and the much more concrete determination of the biological structures as compared with the abstract character of the spontaneous structures of society, have indeed made the organismal conception of very questionable value for social theory. It has been abused even more than the term 'order' itself when interpreted as a made order or *taxis*, and has frequently been used to defend a hierarchical order, the necessity of 'degree', the relation of command and obedience, or the preservation of established positions of particular individuals, and for this reason has rightly become suspect.

The term 'organization', on the other hand, which in the nineteenth century was frequently used in contrast to 'organism' to express the distinction we have discussed,<sup>19</sup> and which we shall retain to describe a made order or *taxis*, is of comparatively recent origin. It seems to have come into general use at the time of the French Revolution, with reference to which Kant once observed that 'in a recently undertaken reconstruction of a great people into a great state the word *organization* has been frequently and appropriately used for the institution of the magistracies and even the whole state.'<sup>20</sup> The word became characteristic of the spirit of the Napoleonic period<sup>21</sup> and became the central conception in the plans for the 'reconstruction of society' of the chief founders of modern socialism, the Saint Simonians, and of Auguste Comte.<sup>22</sup> Until the term 'socialism' came into general use 'the organization of society as a whole' was in fact the accepted way of referring to

what we may describe as socialism.<sup>23</sup> Its central role, particularly for French thinking during the early part of the nineteenth century, was clearly seen by the young Ernest Renan, who in 1849 could speak of the ideal of a 'scientific organization of mankind as the last word of modern science and its daring but legitimate ambition'.<sup>24</sup>

In English, the word appears to have come into general use around 1870 as a technical term for a 'systematic arrangement for a definite purpose'.<sup>25</sup> But it was the Germans who adopted it with particular enthusiasm and to whom it soon appeared to express a peculiar capacity in which they believed themselves to excel other people. This even led to a curious rivalry between French and German scholars, who during the First World War conducted a slightly comic literary dispute across the fighting lines as to which of the two nations had the stronger claim to possessing the secret of organization.<sup>26</sup>

In continuing the term here to a made order or *taxis* we follow what seems to have become the general use in sociology and especially in what is known as 'organization theory'.<sup>27</sup> The idea of organization in this sense is a natural consequence of the discovery of the powers of the human intellect and especially of the general attitude of constructivist rationalism. It appeared for a long time as the only procedure by which an order serviceable to human purposes could be deliberately achieved, and it is indeed the intelligent and practical method of achieving certain known and foreseeable results. But its development is one of the great achievements of constructivism, so is the disregard of its limits one of its most serious defects. What it overlooks is that the growth of that mind which directs an organization, and of the more comprehensive order within which organizations function, rests on adaptations to the unforeseeable, and that the only possibility of transcending the capacity of individual minds is to rely on those super-personal 'self-organizing' forces which create spontaneous orders.

## PRINCIPLES AND EXPEDIENCY

The frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty.

Constitution of North Carolina\*

### *Individual aims and collective benefits*

The thesis of this book is that a condition of liberty in which all are allowed to use their knowledge for their purposes, restrained only by rules of just conduct of universal application, is likely to produce for them the best conditions for achieving their aims; and that such a system is likely to be achieved and maintained only if all authority, including that of the majority of the people, is limited in the exercise of coercive power by general principles to which the community has committed itself. Individual freedom, wherever it has existed, has been largely the product of a prevailing respect for such principles which, however, have never been fully articulated in constitutional documents. Freedom has been preserved for prolonged periods because such principles, vaguely and dimly perceived, have governed public opinion. The institutions by which the countries of the Western world have attempted to protect individual freedom against progressive encroachment by government have always proved inadequate when transferred to countries where such traditions did not prevail. And they have not provided sufficient protection against the effects of new desires which even among the peoples of the West now often loom larger than the older conceptions—conceptions that made possible the periods of freedom when these peoples gained their present position.

I will not undertake here a fuller definition of the term 'freedom' or enlarge upon why we regard individual freedom as so important. That I have attempted in another book.<sup>1</sup> But a few words should be said about why I prefer the short formula by which I have repeatedly described the condition of freedom, namely a state

- 1947); J. Needham, *Time: The Refreshing River* (London, 1943); and A. G. N. Flew, *Evolutionary Ethics* (London, 1967).
- 36 Carl Menger, *Problems of Economics and Sociology*, edited by Louis Schneider (Urbana, Ill., 1963), p. 94.
- 37 At the head of this tradition one should probably mention B. de Spinoza and his often quoted statement in *Ethics* (Everyman edition, p. 187) that, 'He is a free man who lives according to the dictates of reason alone.'
- 38 Voltaire, *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, s.v. 'Loi', in *Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire*, edited by Hachette, tom. xviii, p. 432: 'Voulez-vous avoir de bonnes lois? Brulez les vôtres et faites nouvelles.'
- 39 R. A. Palmer, *The Age of Democratic Revolution*, vol. 1 (Princeton, 1959), p. 114.
- 40 Edmund Burke, 'A vindication of natural society', Preface in *Works* (London, 1808), p. 7.
- 41 Alexander Herzen, *From the Other Shore*, edited by I. Berlin (London, 1956), pp. 28 and 141.
- 42 Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (Berkeley, Calif., 1951), p. 141.
- 43 Quoted in John Maynard Keynes, *Two Memoirs* (London, 1949), p. 97.
- 44 See J. Piaget, *The Child's Conception of the World* (London, 1929), p. 359: 'The child begins by seeking purpose everywhere and it is only secondarily that it is concerned with classing them as purposes of the things themselves (animism) and purposes of the makers of the things (artificialism).'
- 45 As, following earlier writers, I have myself done in the past. For the reasons why this expression now appears to me misleading see my lecture on 'Kinds of rationalism' in *S.P.P.E.*
- 46 See my paper on 'The primacy of the abstract' in A. Koestler and J. R. Smithies (eds), *Beyond Reductionism* (London, 1969).
- 47 See Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London, 1949).
- 48 See G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, ed G. Lasson, third edition (Leipzig, 1930), and reprinted in *Gesellschaft, Staat, Geschichte*, edited by F. Bülow (Leipzig, no date), p. 317: 'Die Richtung, die an der Abstraktion festhält, ist der Liberalismus, über den das Konkrete immer siegt, und gegen das er überall Bankrott macht.' The passage is not contained in the corresponding places of the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* in *Werke* (Berlin, 1837), vol 9 or in the *Jubiläumsausgabe* (Stuttgart, 1928), vol. 11, pp. 556-7.

## CHAPTER TWO COSMOS AND TAXIS

- \* Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (London, 1759), Part 6, ch. 2, penultimate paragraph. It deserves to be noted that this

passage contains some of the basic concepts and terms we shall have to use throughout this book: the conception of a spontaneous order of the *Great Society* as contrasted with a deliberate *arrangement* of the elements; the distinction between *coincidence* and *opposition* between the rules (*principles of motion*) inherent in the elements and those imposed upon them by legislation; and the interpretation of the social process as a *game* which will go on smoothly if the two kinds of rules are in concord but will produce *disorder* if they are in conflict.

- 1 See my essay on 'The theory of complex phenomena', in F. A. Hayek, *Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics* (London and Chicago, 1967, henceforth referred to as *S.P.P.E.*). It was in fact at first entirely the result of methodological considerations that led me to resume the use of the unpopular concept of 'order': see also F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science* (Chicago, 1952), p. 39: 'If social phenomena showed no order except in so far as they were consciously designed, there would indeed be no room for a theoretical science of society and there would be, as is often maintained, only problems of psychology.' In recent discussion the term 'system' is often used in much the same sense in which I use here 'order', which still seems to me preferable.
- 2 It would seem that the currency of the concept of order in political theory goes back to St Augustine. See in particular his dialogue *Ordo* in J. P. Migne (ed) *Patrologiae cursus completus sec. lat.* 32/47 (Paris, 1861-2), and in a German version *Die Ordnung*, trans. C. J. Peel, fourth edition (Paderborn, 1966).
- 3 See L. S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic* (London, 1933), p. 228: 'When we know how a set of elements is ordered, we have a basis for inference.' See also Immanuel Kant, *Werke* (Akademie Ausgabe), *Nachlass*, vol 6, p. 669: 'Ordnung ist die Zusammenfügung nach Regeln.'
- 4 See E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Social Anthropology* (London, 1951), p. 49; see also *ibid.*, p. 19:
- It is evident that there must be uniformities and regularities in social life, that society must have some sort of order, or its members could not live together. It is only because people know the kind of behaviour expected of them, and what kind of behaviour to expect from others, in the various situations of life, and coordinate their activities in submission to rules and under the guidance of values that each and all are able to go about their affairs. They can make predictions, anticipate events, and lead their lives in harmony with their fellows because every society has a form or pattern which allows us to speak of it as a system, or structure, within which, and in accordance with which, its members live their lives.

- 5 See L. S. Stebbing, *op. cit.*, p. 229: 'Order is most *apparent* where man has been at work.'
- 6 See J. Ortega y Gasset, *Mirabeau o el político* (1927), in *Obras Completas* (Madrid, 1947), vol. 3, p. 603: 'Orden no es una presión que desde fuera se ejerce sobre la sociedad, sin un equilibrio que se suscita en su interior.'
- 7 See H. von Foerster and G. W. Zopf, Jr (eds) *Principles of Self-Organization* (New York, 1962) and, on the anticipation of the main conceptions of cybernetics by Adam Smith, cf. G. Hardin, *Nature and Man's Fate* (New York, 1961), p. 54; and Dorothy Emmet, *Function, Purpose and Powers* (London, 1958), p. 90.
- 8 See H. Kuhn, 'Ordnung im Werden und Zerfall', in H. Kuhn and F. Wiedmann (eds), *Das Problem der Ordnung* (Sechster Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, Munich, 1960, publ. Meisenheim am Glan, 1962), especially p. 17.
- 9 See Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, trans. G. Highet, vol. 1, second edition (New York, 1945), p. 110, about 'Anaximander of Miletus transferring the concept of *dike* from the social life of the city-state to the realm of nature. . . . This is the original of the philosophical idea of cosmos: for the word originally signified the *right order* in a state or in a community'; and *ibid.*, p. 179: 'So the physicist's cosmos became by a curious retrogression in thought, the pattern of eunomia in human society.' See also the same author's 'Praise of law' in P. Sayre (ed), *Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies: Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound* (New York, 1947), especially p. 358:

A world thus 'justified' could be called rightly by another term taken over from the social order, a cosmos. That word occurs for the first time in the language of the Ionian philosophers; by taking this step and extending the rule of *dike* to reality as a whole they clearly revealed the nature of Greek legal thought and showed that it was based on the relationship of justice to being.

And *ibid.*, p. 361: 'The law on which it [the *polis*] was founded was not a mere decree but the *nomos*, which originally meant the sum total of that which was respected by all living custom with regard to what is right and wrong'; and *ibid.*, p. 365 on the fact that even during the period of the dissolution of the old Greek faith in law: 'the strict relationship of the *nomos* to the nature of the cosmos was not universally questioned.'

For Aristotle, who connects *nomos* with *taxis* rather than *kosmos* (see *Politics*, 1287a, 18, and especially 1326a, 30: *ho te gar nomos taxis tis esti*), it is characteristically inconceivable that the order resulting from the *nomos* should exceed what the orderer can survey, 'for who will command its over-swollen multitude in war? or who will serve as

its herald, unless he had the lungs of Stentor?' The creation of order in such a multitude is for him a task only the gods can achieve. Elsewhere (*Ethics*, IX, x, §3) he even argues that a state, i.e. an ordered society, of a hundred thousand people is impossible.

10 Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, edited by E. Cannan, vol. 1, p. 421.

11 See G. Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Detroit, 1962), p. 306:

Western man for two and a half millennia has sought liberty in the law. . . . [Yet] the widespread scepticism about the value of the juridical protection of liberty is not unjustified. The reason for this is that our conception of law has changed; and that, as a consequence, law can no longer give us the protection that it did give us in the past.

- 12 See Philo of Alexandria, *Quod omnis probus liber sit*, 452, 45, Loeb edition, vol. IX, p. 36: '*hosoi de meta nomou zosin, eleuteroi*'. On freedom in ancient Greece see in particular Max Pohlenz, *The Idea of Freedom in Greek Life and Thought* (Dordrecht, 1962). On Cicero and the Roman concept of liberty generally see U. von Lübtow, *Blüte und Verfall der römischen Freiheit* (Berlin, 1953); Theo Mayer-Maly, 'Rechtsgeschichte der Freiheitsidee in Antike und Mittelalter', *Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht*, N.F. VI, 1956; and G. Crifo, 'Su alcuni aspetti della libertà in Roma', *Archivio Giuridico 'Filippo Serafini'*, sesta serie, xxiii, 1958.
- 13 See R. W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages* (New Haven, 1953), p. 107 *et seq.*:

The hatred of that which was governed, not by rule, but by will, went very deep in the Middle Ages. . . . The higher one rose towards liberty, the more the area of action was covered by law, the less it was subject by will. . . . Law was not the enemy of freedom; on the contrary, the outline of liberty was traced by the bewildering variety of law which was slowly evolved during our period. . . . High and low alike sought liberty by insisting on enlarging the number of rules under which they lived. . . . It was only when the quality of freedom was articulated by being attached to the status of knight, burgess or baron that it could be observed, analysed and measured. . . . Liberty is a creation of law, and law is reason in action; it is reason which makes men, as we should say, ends in themselves. Tyranny, whether of King John or of the Devil, is a manifestation of the absence of law.

- 14 Most emphatically, perhaps, Adam Ferguson, *Principles of Moral and Political Science* (Edinburgh, 1792), vol. 2, p. 258 *et seq.*:

Liberty or freedom is not, as the origin of the name may seem to imply, an exemption from all restraint, but rather the most

effectual application of every just restraint to all the members of a free state, whether they be magistrates or subjects.

It is under just restraints only that every person is safe, and cannot be invaded, either in the freedom of his person, his property, or innocent action. . . . The establishment of a just and effectual government is of all circumstances in civil society the most essential to freedom: that everyone is justly said to be free in proportion as the government under which he resides is sufficiently powerful to protect him, at the same time that it is sufficiently restrained and limited to prevent the abuse of this power.

15 Daniel Webster is credited with the statement that 'Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from the authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right'; and Charles Evans Hughes with that 'Liberty and Law are one and inseparable'. There are many similar statements by continental legal scholars of the last century, e.g. Charles Beudant, *Le Droit individuel et l'état* (Paris, 1891), p. 5: 'Le Droit, au sens le plus général du mot, est la science de la liberté'; and Karl Binding who argued somewhere that 'Das Recht ist eine Ordnung menschlicher Freiheit.'

16 See J. Bentham, 'Principles of the civil code', in *Theory of Legislation*, edited by C. K. Ogden (London, 1931), p. 98: 'Laws cannot be made except at the expense of liberty.' Also in *Deontology* (London and Edinburgh, 1834), vol. 2, p. 59:

There are few words which, with its derivations, have been more mischievous than this word liberty. When it means anything beyond mere caprice and dogmatism, it means good government; and if good government had had the good fortune to occupy the same place in the public mind which has been occupied by liberty, the crimes and follies which have disgraced and retarded the progress of political improvement would hardly have been committed. The usual definition of liberty—that it is the right to do everything that the law does not forbid—shows with what carelessness words are used in ordinary discourse or composition; for if the laws are bad, what becomes of liberty? and if the laws are good, where is its value? Good laws have a definite intelligible meaning; they pursue an evidently useful end by obviously appropriate means.

17 See for example, Jean Salvaire, *Autorité et liberté* (Montpellier, 1932), p. 65 *et seq.*, who argues that 'the complete realization of liberty is, in fact, nothing else but the complete abolition of law. . . . Law and liberty are mutually exclusive'.

18 Edmund Burke, 'Letter to W. Elliot' (1795), in *Works* (London, 1808), vol. 7, p. 366:

These analogies between bodies natural and politick, though they may sometimes illustrate arguments, furnish no arguments for themselves. They are but too often used under the colour of a specious philosophy, to find apologies for the despair of laziness and pusillanimity, and to excuse the want of all manly efforts, when the exigencies of our country call for them the more loudly.

19 For a characteristic use of the contrast between 'organism' and 'organization' see Adolf Wagner, *Grundlegung der politischen Ökonomie, I. Grundlagen der Volkswirtschaft* (Leipzig, 1876), § § 149 and 209.

20 See Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Berlin, 1790), Part 2, section 1, § 65n.: 'So hat man sich bei einer neuerlich unternommenen gänzlichen Umbildung eines grossen Volkes zu einem Staat des Wortes *Organisation* häufig für Einrichtung der Magistraturen usw. und selbst des ganzen Staatskörpers sehr schicklich bedient.'

21 See H. Balzac, *Autre étude de femme*, in *La Comédie Humaine*, Pleiade edition, vol. 3, p. 226: 'Organiser, par exemple, est un mot de l'Empire et qui contient Napoléon tout entier.'

22 See, for example, the journal edited by H. de Saint Simon and Auguste Comte called *Organisateur*, reprinted in *Oeuvres de Saint Simon et d'Enfantin* (Paris, 1865-78), vol. 20, especially p. 220, where the aim of the work is described as 'D'imprimer au XIX siècle le caractère organisateur'.

23 See in particular Louis Blanc, *Organisation du travail* (Paris, 1839), and H. Ahrens, *Rechtsphilosophie*, fourth edition (Vienna, 1852) on 'organization' as the magic word of the communists and socialists; see also Francis Lieber, 'Anglican and Gallican liberty' (1848), in *Miscellaneous Writings* (Philadelphia, 1881), vol. 2, p. 385:

The fact that Gallican liberty expects everything from *organization*, while Anglican liberty inclines to development, explains why we see in France so little improvement and expansion of institutions; but when improvements are attempted, a total abolition of the preceding state of things—a beginning *ab ovo*—a rediscussion of the first elementary principles.

24 See Ernest Renan, *L'Avenir de la Science* (1890), in *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris, 1949), vol. 3, p. 757: 'ORGANISATION SCIENTIFIQUEMENT L'HUMANITÉ, tel est donc le dernier mot de la science moderne, telle est son audace mais légitime prétention.'

25 See *Shorter Oxford Dictionary*, s.v. 'organization', which shows, however, that the term was already used by John Locke.

26 Jean Labadie (ed), *L'Allemagne, a-t-elle le secret de l'organisation?* (Paris, 1916).

27 See Dwight Waldo, 'Organization theory: an elephantine problem', *Public Administration Review*, xxx, 1961, and reprinted in *General*

1930s, *Yearbook of the Society for General System Research*, VII, the preceding volume of which contains a useful collection of articles on the theory of organization.

#### ARTICLE THREE PRINCIPLES AND EXPEDIENCY

1 The Constitution of the State of North Carolina. The idea is probably derived from David Hume's, *Essays*, in *Works III*, p. 482: 'A government, says Machiavelli, must often be brought back to its original principles.' An earlier version of this chapter appeared in *Towards Liberty, Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises* (Menlo Park, Calif., 1961), vol. I.

2 F. A. Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (London and Chicago, 1960).

3 John Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, edited by E. Cannan (London, 1930), p. 184; see also John Locke, *Second Treatise on Government*, edited by P. Laslett (Cambridge, 1960), section 22: 'a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rules prescribe not.'

4 A. V. Dicey, *Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion during the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1914), p. 257:

The beneficial effect of State intervention, especially in the form of legislation, is direct, immediate, and so to speak visible, whilst its evil effects are gradual and indirect, and lie outside our sight. . . . Hence the majority of mankind must almost of necessity look with undue favour upon government intervention. This natural bias can be counteracted only by the existence, in a given society, . . . of a presumption or prejudice in favour of individual liberty, that is of *laissez-faire*.

5 E. Küng, *Der Interventionismus* (Bern, 1941), p. 360: 'Die stetigen und gewollten Nachwirkungen der meisten wirtschaftspolitischen Massnahmen treten kurz nach ihrer Inkraftsetzung auf, manchmal schwerer wirkenden Fernwirkungen erst später.' This has been preached with such far-reaching effect on the American intellectuals by John Dewey: see for example, his essay 'Force and coercion', *International Journal of Ethics*, xvi, 1916, especially p. 362. Whether the use of force is justified or not . . . is, in substance, a question of efficiency (including economy) of means in the attainment of ends.'

6 Benjamin Constant, 'De l'arbitraire', in *Oeuvres politiques*, edited by L. Courcier (Paris, 1874), pp. 71-2.

7 Frédéric Bastiat, *Ce qu'on voit et ce qu'on ne voit pas en économie politique* (Paris, 1850), English translation in his *Selected Essays in Political Economy*, edited by G. B. de Huszar (Princeton, 1964), his best and most brilliant essay.

7 Carl Menger, *Problems of Economics and Sociology*, edited by L. Schneider (Urbana, Ill., 1963).

8 See W. Y. Elliott, *The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics* (New York, 1928).

9 On these lines particularly R. A. Dahl and Charles Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York, 1953), pp. 3-18, e.g. p. 16: 'Techniques and not "isms" are the kernel of rational action in the Western world. Both socialism and capitalism are dead.' This is precisely the cause of our drift.

10 London and Chicago, 1944.

11 See Preface to W. S. Jevons, *The State in Relation to Labour* (London, 1882).

12 Herbert Spencer, *Justice: Being Part IV of the Principles of Ethics* (London, 1891), p. 44.

13 J. A. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis* (New York, 1954), p. 394.

14 Adam Smith, *op. cit.* vol. I, p. 435.

15 See for example, Max Weber, *On Law in Economy and Society*, edited by Max Rheinstein (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), p. 298.

16 See the essays on *Capitalism and the Historians*, by various authors, edited by the present writer (London and Chicago, 1953).

17 David Hume, *Essays*, in *Works III*, p. 125, and compare the passages by J. S. Mill and Lord Keynes quoted on p. 113 and in note 14 to ch. 6 of my book, *The Constitution of Liberty*, to which may now be added a similar statement by G. Mazzini which I have seen quoted without source: 'Ideas rule the world and its events. A revolution is the passage of an idea from theory to practice. Whatever men say, material interests never have caused, and never will cause a revolution.'

18 It was therefore also not, as J. A. Schumpeter kindly suggested in a review of *The Road to Serfdom* in *Journal of Political Economy*, xiv, 1946, 'politeness to a fault' but profound conviction about what are the decisive factors if that book 'hardly ever attributes to opponents anything beyond intellectual error'.

19 As one of Carl Schmitt's followers, George Dahm, reviewing Schmitt's *Drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens* (Hamburg, 1934), in *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, xcvi, 1935, p. 181, wrote, all Schmitt's works 'sind von Anfang an auf ein bestimmtes Ziel gerichtet gewesen: die Entlarvung und Zerstörung des liberalen Rechtsstaates und die Überwindung des Gesetzgebungsstaates'. The most appropriate comment on Schmitt came from Johannes Huizinga, *Homo Ludens* (1944), English translation (London, 1947), p. 209:

I know of no sadder and deeper fall from human reason than

Schmitt's barbarous and pathetic delusion about the friend-foe principle. His inhuman cerebrations do not even hold water as a piece of formal logic. For it is not war that is serious but peace.