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[1] ONS Population Estimates by Ethnic Group, 2001 to 2005
[2] D. Helbing, and T. Vicsek, Optimal Self-organization. New Journal of Physics 1, 13.1 - 13.17 (1999).
[3] D. Helbing, and T. Platkowski, Self-organization in space and induced by fluctuations. International Journal of Chaos Theory and Applications 5, 47-59 (2000).
[4] D. Helbing, and T. Platkowski, Drift- or fluctuation-induced ordering and self-organization in driven many-particle systems. Europhysics Letters 60, 227-233 (2002).

Exercises:

(1) Formulate a mathematical model that can evaluate the level of segregation. For example, x_ij is the proportion of ethnic group i at district j. Suppose there are n ethnic groups and m districts. Then y = f(x₁₁,..., x_nm) can give the level of segregation for the whole area. More segregated distribution should obtain larger y.

(2) Implement Schelling's model. Agents can migrate to their new preferred locations by the evaluation of racial/ethnic composition. For example. one can decide to migrate if the proportion of its own ethnicity is larger than 50%. The simulation area can be a one or two dimentional checkerboard. Random initial distribution can be applied. Animation of the simulation results is preferred.

and Social Cooperation

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Exercises:
(1) Describe the problem of social order. Compare the classical approaches by Hobbes and Parsons with the modern approach by Ernst Fehr and its underlying mathematical theories as the theory of inequity aversion. Among other sources, refer to the articles (a) Fehr, E. & Gintis, H. (2007), 'Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations', Annual Review of Sociology 33, 43-64, (b) Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M. (1999), A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3), 817-868., and (c) Camerer, C. (2003), Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction, Princeton. University Press.

(2) How do you explain with game theoretic models why cooperation in collective goods experiments (a) breaks down in the absence of a punishment opportunity and (b) almost full cooperation is achieved if punishment is possible. Take into account that punishment is costly and that actors in the social group are strangers, i.e. do not meet again in the future. Among other sources, refer to the references (a) Fehr, E. & Gachter, S. (2002), 'Altruistic Punishment in Humans', Nature 415(10), 137-140, (b) Fehr, E. & Gintis, H. (2007), 'Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations', Annual Review of Sociology 33, 43-64, (c) Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M. (1999), A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3), 817-868., (d) Bolton, G. E. & Ockenfels, A. (2000), 'ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition', American Economic Review 90(1), 166-193, (e) Rabin, M. (1993), 'Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics', American Economic Review 83(5), 1281-1302.

(3) Explain why the model of Fehr and Schmidt has different predictions compared to the model of Bolton & Ockenfels for third party punishment experiments. Among other sources refer to (a) Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. (2004), Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, Evolution and Human Behavior 25(2), 63-87, (b) Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M. (1999), A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3), 817-868., (c) Bolton, G. E. & Ockenfels, A. (2000), 'ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition', American Economic Review 90(1), 166-193.

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• Video 1: Break Points

• Video 2: Explosive

• Video 3: Fluid

• Video 4: GeoSim

• Video 5: Outburst